Sacred Heart University

DigitalCommons@SHU
WCOB Faculty Publications

Jack Welch College of Business

2010

Intra-industry Effects of Takeovers: A Study of the
Operating Performance of Rival Firms
Rupendra Paliwal
Sacred Heart University, paliwalr@sacredheart.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/wcob_fac
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the
Corporate Finance Commons
Recommended Citation
Paliwal, Rupendra, "Intra-industry Effects of Takeovers: A Study of the Operating Performance of Rival Firms" (2010). WCOB Faculty
Publications. Paper 177.
http://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/wcob_fac/177

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Jack Welch College of Business at DigitalCommons@SHU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in WCOB Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@SHU. For more information, please contact
ferribyp@sacredheart.edu.

The International Journal of Business and Finance Research ♦ Volume 4 ♦ Number 2 ♦ 2010

INTRA-INDUSTRY EFFECTS OF TAKEOVERS: A
STUDY OF THE OPERATING PERFORMANCE OF
RIVAL FIRMS
Rupendra Paliwal, Sacred Heart University
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates whether the managers of industry rivals act to mitigate their agency exposure and
improve operating performance when one of the firms in the industry is subject to a takeover attempt.
The results indicate that rival firms in general decrease free cash flows, improve operating performance,
reduce capital expenditures and increase leverage in response to a control threat within the industry. In
particular, rival firms with potentially higher agency costs i.e. fewer investment opportunities and high
cash or high free cash flows exhibit a higher reduction in cash levels and free cash flows subsequent to a
control threat in their industry. These results are consistent with the inefficient management hypothesis,
which suggests poorly performing firms are more likely to be the target of a takeover attempt and the
acquisition probability hypothesis proposed by Song and Walkling (2000), which states that rivals of
initial targets earn abnormal returns because of an increased probability that they themselves will be
targets. These results lend support to the argument that takeovers act as an effective external control
mechanism for managers and that they have industry wide effects.
JEL: G34
KEYWORDS: Mergers, takeovers, industry rivals, agency costs
INTRODUCTION

C

urrent research documents that industry rivals of takeover targets earn significant positive
announcement period abnormal returns. The traditional explanation for these positive abnormal
returns has focused on changes in the level of competition within the industry. However, more
recently Song and Walkling (SW) (2000) propose and find support for the acquisition probability
hypothesis, which states that the rivals of initial targets earn announcement period abnormal returns
because of increased probability that they themselves will be targets. The focus of their investigation is
on the market performance of rivals. Existing literature suggests that the removal of inefficient
management to improve operating performance is one of the key underlying motives for takeovers
commonly referred to as the inefficient management hypothesis. Thus, the acquisition probability
hypothesis and inefficient management hypothesis together suggest that poorly performing firms are more
likely to be the target of a takeover attempt following an initial takeover announcement in their industry.
This paper investigates, when a firm is subject to a takeover attempt; whether the managers of industry
rivals act to mitigate their agency exposure and improve operating performance to reduce probability of
being themselves subject to a takeover attempt. Specifically, this research investigates whether rivals
with high levels of cash and free cash flows coupled with a low Tobin’s q (few investment opportunities),
low (or high) managerial ownership, low institutional holdings, lower external monitoring by debt holders
and poor operating performance (1) reduce excess funds; (2) reduce capital expenditures; (3) lower their
operating expense and (4) increase their leverage.
The results indicate that rival firms in general decrease cash levels and free cash flows, reduce capital
expenditures, reduce operating expenses and increase leverage in response to a control threat in the
industry. In support of agency arguments, results indicate that rival firms with few investment
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opportunities and high cash or high free cash flows reduce cash levels and free cash flows significantly
subsequent to a control threat in their industry. Furthermore, rivals with high managerial ownership
(entrenched managers) increase leverage and reduce free cash flows in response to a control threat. The
results also indicate that those rivals that increase leverage in response to control threat also reduce their
cash levels and cash flows. Rival firms with low Tobin’s q reduce cash levels, increase leverage and
improve asset turnover.
Overall, the evidence supports the argument that takeovers act as an effective external control mechanism
for managerial agency behavior and that they have industry-wide effects. Rival firms take steps to reduce
their agency exposure and improve operating efficiency in response to a control threat, regardless of the
form (horizontal or non-horizontal) and type (hostile or friendly) of the initial takeover.
The research here complements the findings of Servaes and Tamayo (2007) and Song and Walkling
(2000) and other papers examining industry-wide effects of control threat. While Song and Walkling
(2000) focus on abnormal returns to rivals, Servaes and Tamayo (2007) focus on financial policy
variables. Servaes and Tamayo (2007) find that rival firms increase leverage, cut capital expenditures and
reduce their cash balances and free cash flows. However, their sample is restricted to the rivals of 218
firms, which receive hostile takeover bids during the period 1983-1998. They focus only on rivals of
hostile takeover attempts, as agency problems are likely to be the primary motive for control threat for
these firms. They suggest that other firms may have been takeover targets for synergistic reasons
unrelated to agency problems, and their rivals may not respond. However, Schwert (2000) concludes that
hostile takeovers are not distinguishable from friendly takeovers, which justifies the use of an expanded
sample in the research presented here. This study extends their work by (i) covering a much larger and
broader sample of takeovers of all types (ii) examining operating performance in addition to the financial
policy characteristics and (iii) specifically taking in to consideration investment opportunities, managerial
ownership, institutional holdings and level of industry concentration of rivals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section presents background literature and
develops hypotheses. The second section describes the data and methodology and the third reports results
from the univariate analysis of the full and several sub-samples. The fourth section reports results from a
cross-sectional analysis. Section five concludes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
The positive association between acquisition announcements and stock price movements of rival firms in
the same industry as a takeover target has been documented in several studies (See Eckbo (1983, 1985),
Stillman (1983), Banerjee and Eckard (1998), Akhigbe, Borde, and Whyte (2000), Mitchell and Mulherin
(1996)). The traditional explanation for positive announcement period abnormal returns focuses on
horizontal mergers and argues that such mergers decrease competition, thereby encouraging collusion
among the remaining firms in the industry. However, the existing empirical literature does not find
support for this argument. Song and Walkling (2000) provide an alternative explanation for the rivals’
positive announcement period abnormal returns. They propose that the rivals of initial targets earn
abnormal returns because of an increased probability that they themselves will be targets. They term this
argument as the “acquisition probability hypothesis.”
Song and Walkling (2000) find that on average rival firms earn positive abnormal returns regardless of
the form and outcome of the acquisition. They also find that rivals’ abnormal returns in the
announcement period are higher for rival firms with higher probability of acquisition. In addition, rivals
who subsequently become targets earn significantly higher abnormal returns in the announcement period.
Another implication of the acquisition probability hypothesis is that following an initial takeover
announcement rival firm managers may take steps to reduce their agency exposures i.e., their potential to
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overinvest and consume excess perks to avoid being subject to a takeover attempt. This paper
investigates whether the managers of rivals act to mitigate their agency exposure when one of the firms in
the industry is subject to a takeover attempt.
Earlier research has documented that takeover targets usually have small size, low growth rate, low
Tobin’s q, low (or high) managerial ownership and a low level of outside block holder ownership.
Hasbrouck (1985) concludes that the average q–ratio of acquired firms is significantly lower than the
average q-ratio of control groups matched by size or industry. Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989) find that
for successful tender offers, target, bidder and total returns are larger when targets have low q ratios and
bidders have high q ratios. Servaes (1991) uses a broader sample and confirms that these results hold for
both mergers and tender offers. Jensen (1976) argues that a firm with excess free cash flows will have a
tendency to overinvest by undertaking marginal investment projects with negative net present values. An
increase in dividends by such firms will reduce overinvestment and increase market value of the firm.
Consistent with this argument, Lie (2000) documents a favorable market response to large special
dividends and self tender offers when the announcing firm has potentially large agency problems as
indicated by high cash levels coupled with poor investment opportunities (indicated by low Tobin’s q).
More recently, Shahrur (2005) reports significant positive abnormal returns to rivals’, suppliers and
corporate customers of merging firms, thus documenting industry-wide effects of horizontal takeovers.
Bris and Cabolis (2003) find that the Tobin’s q of an industry increases when firms in that industry are
acquired by firms from countries with better shareholder protection and accounting standards. This result
implies that the adoption of better corporate governance practices by one firm has industry-wide effects.
Berger and Ofek (1999) and Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) argue that firms that implement corporate
refocusing programs often do so in the presence of external control pressures such as a takeover threats.
Therefore, I hypothesize that: after an initial takeover attempt in the industry, rival firms with high levels
of cash and free cash flows coupled with low Tobin’s q, low, or high, managerial ownership, low
institutional holdings, lower external monitoring by debt holders and poor operating performance will
reduce their excess funds – a primary symptom of agency costs.
Williamson (1963) argues that managers do not have a neutral attitude towards costs. Managers have
what he describes as expense preference i.e. certain class of expenditures have positive value associated
with them. Specifically staff expenses, expenditure for emoluments and funds available for discretionary
investments have value in addition to that deriving from productivity. He argues that mangers may
choose to shirk and indulge in excessive perquisite consumption. He also observes that the expansion of
physical plant and equipment is also subject to managerial discretion. Takeovers are considered one of
the key mechanisms, which can act as a check against such managerial discretionary behavior. Healy,
Palepu and Ruback (1992) observe a significant improvement in industry adjusted asset productivity for
the combined firm, which leads to higher operating cash flow returns. Trimbath, Frydman and Frydman
(2002) conclude that cost inefficiency is a determinant of the risk of being a takeover target. Therefore, I
hypothesize that: after an initial takeover attempt in the industry, rival firms with high levels of cash and
free cash flows coupled with low Tobin’s q, low, or high, managerial ownership, low institutional
holdings, lower external monitoring by debt holders and poor operating performance will improve their
operating efficiency with lower operating expenses, and reduce their capital expenditure.
Jensen (1976) also argues that when managers issue debt in exchange for stock, they are bonding their
promise to payout future cash flows that cannot be accomplished by a simple dividend increase. Thus,
additional debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flows by reducing cash flows available for spending
at the discretion of managers. Safieddine and Titman (1999) find that on average targets that terminate
takeover offers significantly increase their leverage ratio. These targets which increase their leverage
ratio also reduce their capital expenditure, downsize in terms of assets and employment and their cash
flows and their stock returns outperform the benchmark in the following 5 years. Based on this evidence
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they argue that an increase in leverage by a target in response to a takeover attempt is not a defensive
mechanism but it increases the credibility of a target manager’s promise to improve performance. Lang,
Ofek and Stulz (1996) document evidence suggesting that increased debt induces firms to invest less,
especially for firms with low q. We expect similar behavior from the rivals of targets. Therefore, I
hypothesize that: after an initial takeover attempt in the industry, rival firms with high levels of cash and
free cash flows coupled with low Tobin’s q (few investment opportunities), low (or high) managerial
ownership, low institutional holdings, lower external monitoring by debt holders and poor operating
performance will increase their leverage.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Mergers and tender offers during the period 1992-2000 are identified using the Securities Data Company
(SDC) on-line Mergers and Corporate Transactions database. SDC provides data on the announcement
date, the completion date, acquirer, target six-digit cusip, total deal value, form of payment, and deal
classification as hostile or a tender offer. Firms in regulated industries (Financial, Transportation &
Communication and Public Administration) are eliminated. All other financial data is from
COMPUSTAT. Each target firm is classified according to its four digits SIC code as reported in the
Compact Disclosure database. Target firms are sorted chronologically within their industries. Following
Song and Walkling (2000), initial industry targets are defined as the first firm in an industry to
experience acquisition activity following a minimum 12-month dormant period. Rivals are defined as
firms in the same four digits SIC industry at the time of the initial industry target. Bidders are removed
from the sample to focus on the effects of takeovers on the firms that are not involved in the transaction.
Rivals that are subject to a takeover attempt in the subsequent two years are not included in the sample.
Finally, rivals are included in the sample if they are listed in Compustat and data is available for at least
two years before and after the initial takeover announcement.
Table 1 presents the distribution of initial targets and rival firms for the sample. In total 1512, firms are
identified as targets of acquisition attempts during the period 1992-2000. Out of these 1512 target firms,
511 firms are categorized as initial industry targets. Only 15 of these are identified by SDC as hostile
takeovers. The final sample consists of 4526 rival firms of these 511 initial targets. The number of rivals
is distributed almost evenly across the years, with a slight dip in 1999. The average number of rivals per
target is 8.87 with a median of five rivals per target.
Table 1: Target Firms, Initial Targets and Rival Firms
Year

Number of Acquisitions

Number of Initial Targets

Number of Rival Firms

1992

80

46

717

1993

72

37

452

1994

129

53

555

1995

159

66

577

1996

175

52

567

1997

205

67

554

1998

273

77

504

1999

222

48

199

2000

197

65

401

Total
1512
511
4526
This table shows number of acquisitions, initial targets and number of rival firms in the analysis sample.

Table 2 contains descriptive statistics on some of the test variables for rival firms at the time of the
control threat. The number of companies in the sample changes depending on availability of data on
insider holdings and institutional holdings. Tobin’s Q is approximated by sum of market value of equity

100

The International Journal of Business and Finance Research ♦ Volume 4 ♦ Number 2 ♦ 2010

and book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. The market value of equity is measured three
months before the takeover announcement date using CRSP. Insider holdings are the total number of
shares held in aggregate by all officers and directors as percentage of shares outstanding in the year
acquisition announcement is made (Source: Compact Disclosure). Institutional holdings are from
Compact Disclosure database. To measure the level of concentration in an industry, the Herfindahl index
is constructed using the market shares of all firms in the industry as defined by four digit SIC. Market
shares of each rival = total sales for each rival/ total industry sales. The market share for each rival is
then squared and summed.
On average, rival firms have insider holdings of 22.6% (median = 16.8%) and institutional holdings of
33.85% (median =29.69%) when a control threat in their industry is announced. The average Herfindahl
index at the time of acquisition announcement is 0.38 (median=0.32). This indicates a relatively modest
level of industry concentration. On average at the time of control threat announcement rival firms have a
Tobin’s q of 1.98 (median =1.27).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Insider Holding

Institutional Holding

Herfindahl Index

Mean

22.59

33.85

0.38

Tobin's Q
1.98

Median

16.83

29.69

0.32

1.27

N
4435
4402
511
Descriptive statistics for rival firms at the time of control threat are reported here.

4475

UNIVARIATE ANALYSES OF CHANGES IN THE FINANCIAL RATIOS
This section examines changes in financial ratios of the industry rivals of initial takeover targets. Ratios
are averaged for the two years prior and the two years after the control threat. The change in ratios from
pre-control threat to post-control threat is reported. The following financial ratios are analyzed: OES
(operating expense to net sales), OEA (operating expense to total assets), FCFA (free cash flow to total
assets), CEA (cash and cash equivalents to total assets), CAPEXA (capital expenditures to total assets),
leverage (“TDA”) (total debt to total assets), and (LTDA) (long term debt to total assets). Operating
expenses include cost of goods sold, and selling, general and administrative expenses. Free cash flow is
defined as operating profit minus interest expenses, taxes and dividends.
Complete Sample
Table 3 contains results for the complete sample of rival firms. Panel A reports analysis based on
individual firm observations. In Panel B, ratios are averaged by the control threat before the statistical
analysis. In this analysis, each control threat receives the same weight (rather than in proportion to the
number of rival firms associated with a takeover bid) and the test statistics are unbiased. Table 3 and
subsequent univariate analysis tables, report pre-control threat mean and median values for each ratio in
the first column, post-control threat mean and median values of the ratio in the second column. In the
third column, the change in the ratio from pre to post control threat is calculated for each firm. The mean
and median value of the change is reported. To reduce the influence of outliers, the top and bottom 1
percent of observations for each ratio are removed. This reduces sample size to 4436 rival firms. The
statistical significance of changes in financial ratios from paired t-tests (for means) and Wilcoxon signrank test for medians are reported.
First, the cash levels of the rivals are examined. Jensen (1976) argues that managers have incentives to
expand the corporation beyond its optimal size. If the firm has excess funds it is likely that managers may
invest in negative NPV projects. If rival firms want to mitigate the overinvestment problem, they should
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reduce excess funds. On average, rival firms have a cash equivalent to total assets ratio of 18.38%
(median =10%) two years prior to the control threat. In the two years after the control threat cash the
ratio decreases by 7.3% on average (median = 3.39%). This decrease in cash level is statistically
significant at 1% level. Changes in free cash flow levels subsequent to a control threat are also
investigated. Rival firms on average generate cash flows of 3.69% of total assets (median =7.34%) before
the control threat. The average free cash flow decreases to 2.87% (median =7.24%) after the control
threat. Thus, the results suggest that rivals reduce their agency exposure by decreasing cash levels and
cash flows available to managers.
Table 3: Changes in Financial Ratios of Rival Firms Following Takeover Bids
Panel A: Individual Firm Observations
Financial Ratios
Cash and Equivalents/ Total Assets
Free Cash Flow / Total Assets
Operating Expenses / Total Assets
Operating Expenses / Sales
Long term Debt / Total Assets
Total Debt / Total Assets
Capital Expenditure / Total Assets

(CEA)
(FCFA)
(OEA)
(OES)
(LTDA)
(TDA)
(CAPEXA)

Pre-Control Threat

Post-Control Threat

Change

0.1838

0.1704

-0.0134***

0.1004

0.0925

-0.0034***

0.0369

0.0287

-0.0082 ***

0.0734

0.0724

-0.0023***

1.198

1.1884

-0.0096*

1.0447

1.021

-0.0103***
-0.0831***

1.1387

1.0556

0.9027

0.9063

-0.0007

0.1415

0.1519

0.0104***

0.0848

0.0966

0.0001 ***

0.1948

0.2026

0.0078 ***

0.1560

0.1643

0.0001**

0.0632

0.0592

-0.0041***

0.0481

0.0434

-0.0021 ***

Panel B: Data Aggregated by Control Threat
Cash and Equivalents/ Total Assets
Free Cash Flow / Total Assets
Operating Expenses / Total Assets
Operating Expenses / Sales
Long term Debt / Total Assets
Total Debt / Total Assets

Pre-Control Threat

Post-Control Threat

Change

(CEA)

0.1305

0.1192

-0.0113***

0.1012

0.0891

-0.0072***

(FCFA)

0.0546

0.0416

-0.0129 ***

0.0685

0.0650

-0.0051***

1.2509

1.2298

-0.0212***

1.152

1.1497

-0.0189***

1.162

1.0123

-0.1499***

0.9025

0.9063

-0.0002

0.1741

0.1858

0.0117***

0.1506

0.1661

0.0035***

0.2305

0.2486

0.018***

0.2068

0.2317

0.0072***

0.0677

0.0616

-0.006 ***

(OEA)
(OES)
(LTDA)
(TDA)

Capital Expenditure / Total Assets (CAPEXA)

0.0558
0.0497
-0.004***
Panel A shows the individual firm analysis. Panel B presents ratios and tests aggregated by control threats (n=511). Rivals are defined as
firms in the same four digits SIC industry at the time of the initial takeover attempt in the industry. Free cash flow is defined as operating profit
minus interest expenses, taxes and dividends. Operating expenses include cost of goods sold, selling, general and administrative expenses.
Ratios are averaged for the two years prior and the two years after the control threat. Means are listed in the first line and median in the second
line. In the last column, the mean and median value of change in the ratios from the pre-control threat to post-control threat period is
reportedPaired t-test for means and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for medians are performed. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1
percent levels respectively.

Next, the analysis turns to an examination of the extent to which rival firms take steps to improve
operating efficiency. Trimbath, Frydman and Frydman (2002) conclude that cost inefficiency is a
determinant of the risk of being a takeover target. I expect that rival firms will decrease their operating
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expenses in response to control threats. Operating expenses are measured as the sum of cost of goods
sold and selling general & administrative expenses. In Table 3, average operating expenses as percentage
of total assets decline by 0.8% (median=0.99%) and average operating expenses to sales also decline in
the post-control threat period. The changes are statistically significant.
Another interesting issue is whether rival firms increase their leverage and thereby reduce cash flows
available for spending at the discretion of managers. On average, rival firms have a long-term debt to
total assets ratio of 14.15% (median =8.48%) before the control threat, which increases to an average of
15.19 %( median = 9.66%) after the control threat. Total debt as percentage of assets also increases from
an average of 19.48% (median=15.6%) to an average of 20.26 %( median=16.4%).
Finally, changes in the capital expenditure of rival firms are examined. Safieddine and Titman (1999)
found that targets that increase their leverage ratios also reduce their capital expenditure. Consistent with
the argument that agency problems are often present industry-wide, even rivals reduce capital
expenditures in response to control threats. On average the capital expenditure to assets ratio of rival
firms declines by 6.45% (median=4.37%). These changes are statistically significant.
The results in Panel B (data aggregated by control threat) are similar to those reported in Panel A. Rival
firms reduce cash levels, cash flows, operating expenses and capital expenditures while they increase
leverage. Overall, the evidence reported in Table 3 suggests that rival firms take steps to reduce their
agency exposure and improve operating efficiency in response to a control threat in the industry.
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS ACROSS PORTFOLIOS OF RIVAL FIRMS
To test whether a specific subset of rival firms responds more to control threat, test for the univariate
statistical significance of changes in financial ratios across sub-samples of acquisitions and rival firms are
conducted. Rivals are categorized by the level of managerial ownership, institutional holdings, nature of
the initial takeover bid (horizontal or non-horizontal), tender offers, degree of industry concentration, and
investment opportunities (Tobin’s q).
Managerial Ownership
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that if managers hold a large fraction of outstanding firm shares then
agency problems are less severe. However Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) and Stulz (1988) suggest
a nonlinear effect of managerial holdings. They argue that higher levels of managerial holdings entrench
management from the discipline of market for corporate control. Song and Walkling (1993) document
that takeover targets have lower managerial ownership than a control sample. Rival firms with low
insider holdings and those with high insider holdings are expected to reduce agency problems in response
to a control threat in their industry the most. Insider holdings (IH) is the total number of shares held in
aggregate by all officers and directors divided by the number of shares outstanding as reported in the
proxy statement in the year prior to the acquisition. In Table 4 rival firms are classified in to two groups
based on the level of insider holdings (IH): IH< 5% (insider holdings is less than 5%) and IH>25%
(insider holdings is greater than 25%), remaining firms have managerial ownership between 5% and 25%.
The results as reported in Table 4 indicate that rival firms in general decrease their cash levels and free
cash flows. However, the percentage decrease in cash levels and cash flows are higher for the rivals with
insider holdings greater than 25%. The average cash to assets ratio for rivals with IH<5% declines from
14.04% to 13.21% (a decline of 6%), while it declines by 9.2% for rivals with IH>25%. The median
decline in cash to assets ratio for rivals with IH<5% is only 0.71% compared to a median decline of 5.2%
for rivals with IH>25%. Similarly, while free cash flow to assets ratio for rivals with IH<5% witness a
median increase of 0.52%, while rivals with IH>25% shows a median decline of 8.32%.
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Table 4: Managerial Ownership and Rival Firm’s Response to Control Threats

CEA
FCFA
OEA
OES
LTDA
TDA
CAPEXA

Insider holding<5% (N=966)
Pre-Control
Post-Control
Th t
Th t
0.1404
0.1321

Change
-0.0084***

Insider holding>25% (N= 1408 )
Pre-Control
Post-Control
Change
Th t
Th t
0.1861
0.1689
-0.0171***

0.0714

0.0721

-0.0005**

0.1076

0.0894

-0.0056***

0.0530

0.0557

0.0026

0.0423

0.0284

-0.0138***

0.0767

0.0804

0.0004***

0.0733

0.0697

-0.0061***

1.0697

1.0328

-0.0369***

1.3336

1.3151

-0.0185

0.9396

0.8871

-0.0278***

1.1582

1.1484

-0.0051

0.9652

0.9309

-0.0342**

1.0878

1.0311

-0.0568***

0.8715

0.8678

-0.0042***

0.9152

0.9203

0.0027***

0.1708

0.1841

0.0133***

0.1395

0.1518

0.0122***

0.1432

0.1575

0.0001***

0.0704

0.0884

0.0001***

0.2177

0.2337

0.0161***

0.2046

0.2112

0.0066**

0.1978

0.2164

0.0033***

0.1565

0.1691

0.0001

0.0664

0.0621

-0.0043***

0.0657

0.0599

-0.0058***

0.0538
0.0489
-0.0027***
0.0461
0.0412
-0.0026***
Rivals are firms in the same four digits SIC industry at the time of the initial takeover attempt in the industry. Means are listed in the first line
and median in the second line. Ratios are averaged for the two years prior and the two years after the control threat. In the last column, the
mean and median value of change in the ratios from the pre-control threat to post-control threat period is reported. Paired t-test for means and
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for medians are performed. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.

Rival firms decrease operating expenses in the two years after the control threat. This decline in
operating expenses is higher and more significant for rivals with IH<5%. The median operating expenses
to assets ratio for rivals with IH<5% decline from pre-control threat levels of 0.939 to 0.887 in the two
years after the control threat. Rivals with IH<5% also reduce operating expense to sales ratio. Rival
firms with IH<5% and those with IH>25% reduce their capital expenditure and increase leverage. The
median decline in capital expenditure for rivals with IH< 5% and rivals with IH>25% is 5.09% and 5.62%
respectively. The average increase in long-term debt to asset ratio for rivals with IH<5% is 7.77%
compared to an average increase of 8.76% for rivals with IH>25%.
In sum, the univariate results indicate that while rivals with lower managerial ownership focus on
increasing their operating efficiency, rival firms with higher managerial ownership reduce their agency
exposure by decreasing cash levels and cash flows. However, rival firms irrespective of level of
managerial ownership increase leverage and decrease capital expenditure in response to control threats.
Institutional Holdings
In Table 5, rival firms are classified based on the level of institutional holdings. Managers in rival firms
with higher institutional holdings (higher monitoring) are expected to be forced to improve performance
and reduce agency exposure. The results indicate that rival firms with lower (below the median)
institutional holdings experience a median decline of 3.12% in cash and equivalents as percentage of total
assets and a median decline of 7.24% in free cash flow to total assets ratio in the two years after the
control threat. The median cash and equivalents to total assets ratio declines from 11.86% to 10.89%, and
the median free cash flow as percentage of assets declines from 5.39% to 5.04%. In comparison, rivals
with higher (above the median) institutional holdings experience a median decline of 3.39% in cash and
equivalents and 1.48% in free cash flow.
The operating expenses to total assets ratio, for rivals with high institutional holdings declines from a
median value of 0.982 to a median value of 0.945. For rivals with high institutional holding, the median
long term to debt to total assets ratio increases from 10.79% to 12.38%, and median total debt to assets
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ratio also increases from 15.56% to 17.11%. For the rivals with lower institutional holdings, there is no
significant change in operating expenses and leverage.
Table 5: Institutional Holdings and Rival Firm’s Response to Control Threats
Below the median Institutional holdings
( 2201)
Post-Control
Change
Th t
0.1896
-0.0121***

Above the median Institutional holdings
( 2201)
Post-Control
Change
Th t
0.1526
-0.0133***

CEA

Pre-Control
Th t
0.2018
0.1186

0.1089

-0.0037***

0.0854

0.0771

-0.0029***

FCFA

-0.0033

-0.01886

-0.0155***

0.0801

0.0776

-0.0025

0.0539

0.0504

-0.0039***

0.0877

0.0860

-0.0013

OEA

1.2589

1.2712

0.0122

1.1322

1.1055

-0.0267***

1.1216

1.117

0.0157

0.982

0.9452

-0.0211***

OES

1.5047

1.223

-0.2817***

0.9019

0.9143

0.0124***

0.9361

0.9377

-0.0021

0.8723

0.8756

0.0006

0.1271

0.1367

0.0097***

0.1539

0.1646

0.0106***

0.0647

0.0673

0.0001

0.1079

0.1238

0.0001***

0.1946

0.2026

0.008***

0.1908

0.2019

0.011***

0.1499

0.1559

0.0001

0.1556

0.1712

0.0001***

0.0598

0.0541

-0.0057***

0.0661

0.0636

-0.0025***

LTDA
TDA
CAPEXA

Pre-Control
Th t
0.1659

0.0413
0.0374
-0.0023***
0.0542
0.0492
-0.0022***
This table shows institutional holding and rival firm responses to control threats. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels respectively.

The results also indicate that irrespective of levels of institutional holdings rival firms decrease capital
expenditures over the two years after control threat. Capital expenditure declines from a median value of
4.13% to 3.74% for rival firms with low institutional holdings and it declines from a median value 5.42%
to 4.92% for those with high institutional holdings. In sum, the results indicate that rivals with high
institutional holdings (higher external monitoring) take more steps to reduce their agency exposure.
Industry Concentration
Song and Walkling (2000) predict that an acquisition in a highly concentrated industry lowers the
probability of subsequent acquisitions due to anti-trust concerns. Consequently, rivals in less
concentrated industries with higher probability of subsequent takeover attempts, are more likely to take
steps to reduce agency problems. To examine how the degree of industry concentration affects rival’s
response to control threats, the sales-based Herfindahl index is constructed for each industry at the time of
the initial acquisition announcement. Higher index values indicate a higher degree of concentration in
that industry. Results from this analysis are reported in Table 6. For this analysis firms are aggregated by
the control threat, therefore the sample size is 511.
The results indicate that for rivals in less concentrated industries the decrease in cash levels and free cash
flow over the two year after the control threat is more significant. The median cash and equivalents to
total assets ratio declines by 8.02% from 11.96% before control threat to 10.37% after control threat for
rivals in less concentrated industries, below the median Herfindahl index. In comparison, the cash and
equivalents to total assets ratio for rivals in more concentrated industries, above the median Herfindahl
index, declines by 6.29%. The free cash flow to total assets ratio for rivals in less concentrated industries
declines from 6.48% to 6.01%, which is statistically significant at 1%. However, the change in free cash
flow to total assets ratio for rivals in more concentrated industries is not statistically significant.
For rivals in less concentrated industries, the median operating expense to total assets ratio declines by
1.85% which is statistically significant at the 3% level. In comparison, for rivals in more concentrated
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industries operating expense to total assets ratios decline by 1.46% which is statistically significant at the
7% level. Subsequent to control threats rival firms in both groups increase leverage. For rivals in less
concentrated industries, long term debt to total asset ratios increase from a median value of 14.78% to
15.8% while for those in more concentrated industries, a increase from 15.69% to 16.99% occurs. Rival
firms exhibit a similar increase in debt levels, with an average increase of 1% for both the groups.
Finally, rival firms in both groups decrease capital expenditure in the two years after the control threat.
The median capital expenditure to total assets ratio declines by 8.15% for rival firms in less concentrated
industries and it declines by 7.03% for rivals in more concentrated industries. In sum, the results indicate
that consistent with the acquisition probability hypothesis, rivals in industries with low concentration
(higher probability of subsequent takeover attempts) take more steps to reduce their agency exposure.
Table 6: Industry Concentration and Rival Firm’s Response to Control Threats

CEA
FCFA
OEA
OES
LTDA
TDA
CAPEXA

Below the median Herfindahl Index
Pre-Control
Post-Control
Change
Th t
Th t
0.1511
0.1391
-0.0119***

Above the median Herfindahl Index
Pre-Control
Post-Control
Change
Th t
Th t
0.1137
0.1018
-0.0119***

0.1196

0.1037

-0.0096***

0.0874

0.0781

-0.0055***

0.0429

0.0328

-0.0099***

0.0615

0.0461

-0.0154

0.0648

0.0601

-0.0051***

0.0757

0.0713

-0.0049

1.2654

1.2513

-0.0141

1.2509

1.2186

-0.0323**

1.1523

1.1289

-0.0213**

1.152

1.1543

-0.0168

1.643

1.813

0.17**

1.45

1.252

-0.198

0.913

0.916

0.001

0.896

0.897

-0.001

0.1668

0.1758

0.009***

0.1768

0.1927

0.0158***

0.1479

0.1581

0.0011**

0.1569

0.1699

0.0084***

0.2265

0.2371

0.0106***

0.2476

0.2832

0.0357***

0.2037

0.2097

0.0003

0.2176

0.244

0.0112***

0.0655

0.0593

-0.0062***

0.07082

0.0643

-0.0065***

0.0577
0.0506
-0.0047***
0.0541
0.0488
-0.0038***
Herfindahl Index measures industry concentration. The ratios reported below are aggregated by control threats (n=511). Ratios are averaged
for the two years prior and the two years after the control threat. In the last column, the mean and median value of change in the ratios from the
pre-control threat to post-control threat period is reported. Paired t-test for means and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for medians are performed.
*, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.

Horizontal Acquisition
A horizontal acquisition may reduce the number of firms in an industry thereby increasing degree of
concentration. This reduces further chances of acquisition attempts in the industry due to antitrust
concerns. Thus, acquisition probability hypothesis predicts that rivals are more likely to take steps to
reduce agency problems if the initial acquisition in the industry is not a horizontal merger.
Results of the analysis based on this classification of rivals are reported in Table 7. Rivals responding to
horizontal acquisitions reduce their median cash to total assets ratio from 7.62% to 6.9%. The median
decline is 2.36%. In comparison, rivals responding to non-horizontal acquisitions reduce their median
cash to total assets ratio from 11.55% to 10.44% with a median decline of 3.9%. Similarly, the median
decline of 3.88% in free cash flow to total assets ratio for rivals responding to non-horizontal acquisitions
is higher and statistically significant as compared to a decline of 1.16% for rivals responding to horizontal
acquisitions.
For horizontal acquisitions, rivals reduce the median operating expense to total assets ratio by 1.14%,
which is statistically significant at 2% level. In comparison, median operating expense to total assets
ratios for rivals responding to non-horizontal acquisitions declines by 0.96%, which is statistically
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significant at 7% level. On average, the rival firms in both groups reduce their median capital
expenditure by about 4.5% in the two years after the control threat. However, the results indicate that
only rival firms responding to non-horizontal acquisitions increase leverage, which is statistically
significant. Overall results in this section support the acquisition probability hypothesis.
Table 7: Type of Merger and Rival Firm’s Response

CEA
FCFA
OEA
OES

Horizontal Merger (N=1488)
Pre-Control
Post-Control
Change
Th t
Th t
0.1509
0.1405
-0.0105***

Non Horizontal Merger (N=2948)
Pre-Control
Post-Control
Change
Th t
Th t
0.2014
0.1863
-0.0151***

0.0762

0.069

-0.0018***

0.1155

0.1044

-0.0045***

0.0601

0.0532

-0.0068***

0.0218

0.0129

-0.0091***

0.0771

0.0757

-0.0009

0.0722

0.0698

-0.0028***

1.1635

1.144

-0.0194**

1.218

1.2129

-0.0052

1.0299

0.994

-0.0118**

1.0539

1.043

-0.0101

0.9166

0.9072

-0.0094*

1.3524

1.1842

-0.1681***

0.8905

0.8957

-0.0011

0.9106

0.913

-0.0003

LTDA

0.1623

0.1727

0.0104***

0.1325

0.1434

0.0108***

0.1193

0.13903

0.0001**

0.0726

0.0827

0.0001***

TDA

0.2140

0.2196

0.0056*

0.1878

0.1973

0.00945***

0.1880

0.1991

0.0001

0.1435

0.1519

0.0001**

0.0698

0.0658

-0.0039***

0.061

0.0568

-0.00412***

CAPEXA

0.0519
0.0469
-0.0022***
0.0463
0.0419
-0.0022***
Horizontal acquisitions are defined as cases where the initial industry target and its bidder have the same 4-digit SIC code. SIC codes for both
target and bidder are obtained from SDC on-line Mergers and Corporate Transactions database as reported at the time of merger
announcement. Ratios are averaged for the two years prior and the two years after the control threat. In the last column, the mean and median
value of change in the ratios from the pre-control threat to post-control threat period is reported. Paired t-test for means and Wilcoxon signedrank tests for medians are performed. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.

Tender Offers
Tender offers might indicate a greater confidence the part acquirers to improve the target firms
performance. Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) and Loughran and Vijh (1997) document higher
(less negative) announcement period abnormal returns to bidders in tender offers compared to mergers.
Martin and McConnell (1991) document a large turnover of target managers following tender offers,
which suggests that such targets might be characterized by inefficient managers. Therefore, in Table 8
rival firms are classified based on whether the initial target was subject to a tender offer or a merger.
Results indicate that rivals responding to a tender offer in the industry reduce their median cash levels by
a higher percentage (5.68%) compared to that for rivals responding to a merger attempt (2.73%) in the
industry. However, rivals responding to a merger attempt in the industry reduce free cash flow by a
higher percentage (3.28%) compared to rivals responding to a tender offer (1.92%) in the industry.
Operating expenses to total assets ratio for rivals responding to a tender offer declines by 1.58%
compared to a decline of 0.81% for rivals responding to a merger attempt.
Further, rivals responding to a tender offer increase leverage by a higher percentage compared to rivals
responding to a merger attempt in the industry. For rivals responding to a tender offer, the long term debt
to total assets ratio increases from a pre-control threat median value of 9.67% to a median value of
12.35% post-control threat. Similarly the median total debt to total assets ratio for rivals responding to a
tender offer increases from 16.29% to 18.53%, which is statistically significant at 1% level, while the
increase in total debt to total assets ratio for rivals responding to merger attempts is not statistically
significant. Finally, capital expenditure as percentage of total assets decreases for both groups of firms.
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Table 8: Tender Offers and Rival Firm’s Response to Control Threats

CEA
FCFA
OEA
OES
LTDA
TDA
CAPEXA

Pre-Control
Th t
0.1869

Tender offer (n=947)
Post-Control
Change
Th t
0.1684
-0.0185***

Pre-Control
Th t
0.1846

Merger (n=3489)
Post-Control
Th t
0.1724

-0.0123***

Change

0.0968

0.077

-0.0055***

0.1026

0.0969

-0.0028***

0.0385

0.0342

-0.0044

0.0325

0.0225

-0.0101***

0.0731

0.0735

-0.0014

0.0731

0.0713

-0.0024***

1.2536

1.2272

-0.0265**

1.1904

1.1845

-0.0059

1.097

1.0816

-0.0173**

1.0368

1.0125

-0.0084**

1.1649

1.0932

-0.0716*

1.2108

1.0882

-0.1225***

0.8996

0.9043

0.002

0.9045

0.9074

-0.0012

0.1458

0.1696

0.0238***

0.1417

0.1485

0.0067***

0.0967

0.1235

0.0001***

0.0829

0.0896

0.0001*

0.1998

0.2206

0.0209***

0.1957

0.2003

0.0046**

0.1629

0.1854

0.0004***

0.1533

0.1593

0.0001

0.0606

0.0556

-0.0049***

0.0646

0.0607

-0.0039***

0.0481
0.0429
-0.0031***
0.0483
0.0436
-0.0019***
Tender offers are cases as identified by SDC on-line Mergers and Corporate Transactions database. Ratios are averaged for the two years prior
and the two years after the control threat. In the last column, the mean and median value of change in the ratios from the pre-control threat to
post-control threat period is reported. Paired t-test for means and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for medians are performed. *, **, ***, indicate
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.

However, for rivals responding to a tender offer the decrease in median capital expenditure to total assets
is higher at 6.31% compared to a 3.93% increase for rivals responding to merger attempts. Overall,
consistent with agency arguments results indicate that rival firms responding to a tender offer take more
steps to reduce their agency exposure.
Tobin’s Q
Existing research has indicated that takeover targets are characterized by low Tobin’s q and low insider
holdings. Since firms with lower Tobin’s q are more likely to face a takeover attempt, rivals with low
Tobin’s q are more likely to take steps to reduce agency problems after an acquisition attempt in the
industry. In Table 9, firms are classified based on their Tobin’s q at the time of control threat. Tobin’s q
is approximated by the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt, divided by the book value
of assets.
Contrary to expectations, rival firms with higher Tobin’s q reduce their cash levels and cash flows more
significantly than firms with lower Tobin’s q. Rival firms with higher Tobin’s q reduce the median cash
to total assets ratio by 5.43% compared to a decline of 1.48% for rivals with low Tobin’s q. The median
free cash flow to total assets ratio declines by 4.1% for rival firms with higher Tobin’s compared to a
decline of 1.92% for rivals with low Tobin’s.
Moreover, rival firms with higher Tobin’s q reduce their operating expenses to assets ratio by 3.02%.
Both rival firms with higher Tobin’s q and those with lower Tobin’s q increase their leverage. In the
presence of control threats, rival firms with higher Tobin’s q are expected to take advantage of investment
opportunities and increase capital expenditure. However, the results indicate that firms in both groups
significantly decrease the capital expenditure to assets ratio over the post-control threat period. In sum,
contrary to expectations, rival firms with higher Tobin’s q take more steps to reduce agency exposure.
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Table 9: Tobin’s Q and Rival Firm’s Response to Control Threats

CEA
FCFA
OEA
OES
LTDA
TDA
CAPEXA

Above median Tobin's q (N=2218)
Pre-Control
Post-Control
Change
Th t
Th t
0.2611
0.2369
-0.0241 ***

Below Median Tobin's q (N=2218)
Pre-Control
Post-Control
Change
Th t
Th t
0.1087
0.1051
-0.0036

0.1932

0.1618

-0.0105***

0.0539

0.0533

-0.0008**

-0.0026

-0.0166

-0.0132***

0.0613

0.0557

-0.0056***

0.0853

0.0784

-0.0035***

0.0677

0.0665

-0.0013*

1.1214

1.088

-0.0331***

1.2764

1.2888

0.0124*

0.958

0.9225

-0.0289***

1.1255

1.1212

0.0067

1.7494

1.3896

-0.3599***

0.9021

0.9056

0.0036*

0.8894

0.8958

-0.0025

0.9114

0.9128

0.0004

0.1145

0.1266

0.0121***

0.1708

0.18

0 .0092***

0.0481

0.0509

0.0001

0.1316

0.1449

0.0001***

0.1634

0.1736

0.0102***

0.2306

0.2371

0.0065***

0.1016

0.1118

0.0001

0.2108

0.2202

0.0001*

0.0661

0.0612

-0.0048***

0.0629

0.0569

-0.006***

0.0525
0.0472
-0.0031***
0.0442
0.0398
-0.0021***
Tobin’s Q is approximated by the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. Ratios are averaged
for the two years prior and the two years after the control threat. In the last column, the mean and median value of change in the ratios from the
pre-control threat to post-control threat period is reported. Paired t-test for means and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for medians are performed.
*, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.

CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS
Results from univariate analysis in previous sections suggests that rival firms with low or high managerial
ownership, higher institutional holdings, those in less concentrated industries and those responding to
non-horizontal takeovers improve their agency exposure and operating performance significantly. These
results support the hypotheses that improvement in the operational and financial characteristics of rivals
in the wake of a control threats would be greater for the rival firms with more agency problems before the
initial takeover bid. To further explore this and to control for other factors driving the financial and
operating characteristics of the firm, change in financial ratios are used as dependent variables and firm
and industry characteristics associated with the probability of acquisition and agency problems are used as
independent variables in the regression analysis.
As in previous sections, financial ratio changes are the difference between the ratios averaged over two
years post-control threat and the same ratio averaged over the two years prior to the control threat.
Control variables are as reported in the year the of control threat announcement. In each regression, the
dependent variables are individual firm observations. To model dependence between observations for
rivals of the same control threat, appropriate variance-covariance structure for the errors is used.
In the analysis hereafter, Pre-LTD is long-term debt to total asset ratios averaged for the two years prior
to the control threat. Pre-CAPEX, Pre-OEA and Pre-Cash are respectively capital expenditure to total
assets, operating expenses to total assets and cash and equivalent to total assets ratios, averaged for the
two years prior to the control threat. IH5 and IH25 are dummy variables, which are equal to one if insider
holdings are less than 5% and greater than 25%, respectively. LINST is a dummy variable equal to one
for firms with below the median institutional holdings. Year dummies are included in all regressions (not
reported). Low q is a dummy variable equal to one if Tobin’s Q for rival firms is below the median.
Ln(Size) is natural logarithm of market capitalization (price * shares outstanding from CRSP, three
months before the first bid), Firm age at the time of acquisition is computed from each firm’s first CRSP
listing date to the date of acquisition announcement, rounded to years. Herfindahl Index measures
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industry concentration. Horizontal is a dummy variable equal to one for cases where the initial industry
target and its bidder have the same 4-digit SIC code indicating a horizontal merger.
Cash Levels and Rival Firms
It is expected that after the initial takeover attempt in the industry rivals with high levels of cash and free
cash flows coupled with low Tobin’s q, low, or high, managerial ownership, low institutional holdings,
lower external monitoring by debt holders and poor operating performance will reduce excess funds
which are a primary source of agency problems. Two alternate measures of excess funds, cash level and
free cash flows, are used. Free cash flow is defined as operating profit minus interest expenses, taxes and
dividends. Results with change in free cash flow to total asset as the dependent variable are qualitatively
similar to those with change in cash and equivalents to total asset as dependent variable, hence the results
are not reported here. To test this hypothesis, the following cross-sectional regression models for industry
rivals of the targets is estimated:
Change in financial ratio = a0 + a1 ln (Size) + a2 Horizontal + a3 Herfindahl index + a4 Year dummies +
a5 Pre-Long term debt/ Total asset + a6 Pre-Capital expenditure/ Total asset +
a7 Pre-Operating expenses/ Total asset +
a8 Pre-Cash and equivalents /Total asset +
a9 Low q + b1 Insider Holding (IH) <5% + b2 IH>25% + b3 LINST +

b4 Low q * Pre-Cash and equivalents /Total asset +
b5 Low q * Pre-Cash and equivalents /Total asset *IH <5% +
b6 Low q * Pre-Cash and equivalents /Total asset *IH >25% +Error
(1)

The results with change in cash and equivalents to total asset as the dependent variable are reported in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 10. Entries in the second-to-last row indicate that these regressions explain
about 15% of the cross-sectional variations in the change in cash to assets ratio, using adjusted R-square.
The last row indicates the number of rivals firms for which data is available. Dummy variables IH5 (=1 if
IH is less than 5%), IH25 (=1 if IH is greater than 25%), low q (=1 if Tobin’s is below median) and
LINST (=1 if institutional holdings is below median) are introduced in the first regression. In subsequent
regressions, dummy variable low q is interacted with the other dummy variables IH5, IH25 and pre-bid
levels of cash and equivalent to total assets ratio. Because of high degrees of multicollinearity among the
interaction variables and ownership variables, results from these regressions are reported separately.
The regression results indicate that rivals with higher levels of cash before the control threat significantly
reduce cash levels after the control threat. In model 1, rival firms with high managerial ownership
(IH>25%) and rival firms responding to a horizontal acquisition in the industry reduce cash levels as
indicated by negative coefficients for corresponding variables. Contrary to predictions of the acquisition
probability hypothesis, firms in more concentrated industries decrease cash levels significantly.
The coefficients on pre LTD is negative and significant indicating that rivals with a higher pre-bid longterm debt to assets ratio, indicating higher external monitoring, reduce cash levels. Rival firms with
higher capital expenditures pre-takeover significantly reduce their cash levels. Results in model 1 also
indicate rivals with low q decrease cash levels. Consistent with the agency arguments, the results in
model 2 indicate that rival firms with low q and high pre-bid cash levels reduce their cash levels
significantly. Overall, these results are consistent with univariate analysis. Rival firms with few
investment opportunities reduce cash levels. More importantly, rivals with few investment opportunities
and higher levels of cash pre-takeover, indicating higher agency exposure, reduce their cash levels and
free cash flows significantly post control threat.
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Table 10: Rival Firm Characteristics and Change in Cash Levels and Operating Efficiency
Change in Cash Levels

Change in Operating Expense

1

2

Intercept

0.0717***

0.0717***

0.1835***

0.2381***

ln(Size)

-0.0005

-0.0018**

-0.0138***

-0.0186***

Horizontal

-0.0097***

-0.0102***

-0.0075

-0.0061

Herfindahl Index

-0.0338***

-0.0339***

-0.0007

0.0015

-0.0103

-0.0157

0.0473

0.0561*

Pre LTD
Pre CAPEX

3

4

-0.0834***

-0.0837***

-0.2724***

-0.2924***

Pre OEA

0.0026

0.0019

-0.0942***

0.0944***

Pre Cash

-0.2588***

-0.2288***

0.0664

0.0176

Low q

-0.0163***

Low q * Pre Cash
Low q * Pre Cash * IH5
Low q * Pre Cash * IH25

0.0542***
-0.0757**

0.1176

-0.0408

-0.0319

-0.0404

-0.0601

IH5

-0.0069

-0.0168

IH25

-0.0111***

-0.0053

0.0099**

0.0063

LINST
R-SQUARE

0.15

0.12

0.35

0.35

N
4402
4402
4402
4402
This table reports results from the regression model where the dependent variables are the change in cash and equivalent to total assets ratio in
model 1 and 2 and the change in operating expenses to total assets ratio from the pre-control threat to post-control threat periods in model 3 and
4. Ratios for each rival firm are averaged for the two years prior and the two years after the control threat before calculating the change.
Significance test have been adjusted to reflect the lack of independence of observations associated with the same control threat, *, **, ***,
indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.

Operating Efficiency and Rival Firms
Following an initial takeover attempt in the industry, it is expected that rivals with more symptoms of
agency problems will reduce wasteful expenditure and improve their operating efficiency. Operating
efficiency is measured by the operating expense ratio, operating expense divided by assets. Change in the
operating expense ratio as dependent variable in regression equation (1). The results of this analysis are
reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 10.
One would expect that industry rivals with more agency symptoms as indicated by high levels of cash and
free cash flows coupled with low investment opportunities, low or high managerial ownership, low
institutional holdings, lower external monitoring by debt holders and poor operating performance to
reduce their operating expenses. The results indicate that large rival firms decrease the operating
expenses to asset ratio after the control threat. Contrary to expectations, rival firms with low q increase
operating expenses. The results indicate that firms with high capital expenses before a control threat
reduce operating expenses significantly subsequent to the control threat. Further, rivals with high
operating expenses in pre-bid period, reduce operating expenses post control threat.
Leverage and Rival Firms
As noted earlier, Jensen (1976) argues that when managers issue debt in exchange for stock, they are
bonding their promise to payout future cash flows that cannot be accomplished by a simple dividend
increase. Thus, additional debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flows by reducing future cash flows
available for spending at the discretion of managers. Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) document evidence
suggesting that increased debt induces firms to invest less, especially firms with low q. Based on this
evidence, one would expect rivals in general and those with high levels of cash and free cash flows
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coupled with low q, low managerial ownership, low institutional holdings, lower external monitoring by
debt holders and poor operating performance in particular, to increase the degree of leverage in response
to an acquisition attempt in the industry. To test this argument, the change in leverage ratio is used as the
dependent variable in regression equation 1. Results of this analysis are reported in Table 11.
Table 11: Rival Firm Characteristics and Change in Leverage
Change in Debt
1

2

Intercept

0.0357***

0.0507***

ln(Size)

0.0022

0.0019

Horizontal

0.0022

0.0031

Herfindahl Index
Pre LTD

-0.0023

-0.0001

-0.3153***

-0.3134***

Pre CAPEX

0.1074***

0.1028***

Pre OEA

-0.0114***

-0.0114***

Pre Cash

-0.0447***

-0.0563***

Low q

0.0124**

Low q * Pre Cash

-0.0271

Low q * Pre Cash * IH5

0.0276

Low q * Pre Cash * IH25

0.0387

IH5

0.0133

IH25

0.0101**

LINST
R-SQUARE

-0.0018
0.14

0.13

N
4402
4402
This table shows results from the regression model where the dependent variable is the change in long-term debt to total assets ratio from the
pre-control threat to post-control threat periods. Year dummies are included in all regressions (not reported). P-values (reported next to
coefficients in parentheses) have been adjusted to reflect the lack of independence of observations associated with the same control threat.

Existing research has documented that firms with entrenched managers have low levels of debt and they
increase leverage in response to a control threat. Consistent with this evidence, the results here indicate
that firms with higher insider ownership (IH25) increase leverage. A negative and significant coefficient
on Pre LTD indicates that rivals with higher (lower) levels of debt reduce (increase) long-term debt.
Rival firms with high levels of capital expenditures increase leverage. However, rivals with higher cash
and those with higher operating expenses reduce leverage subsequent to the control threat. The results
also suggest that rivals with fewer investment opportunities increase their leverage.
Change in Leverage and Response of Rival Firms
Safieddine and Titman (1999) find that on average targets that terminate takeover offers significantly
increase their leverage ratio. These targets which increase their leverage ratio also reduce their capital
expenditure, downsize in terms of assets and employment and their cash flows and stock returns
outperform the benchmark in the following 5 years. They argue that the increase in leverage by a target
in response to a takeover attempt is not a defensive mechanism but it increases the credibility of a target
manager’s promise to improve performance. To explore whether this findings holds for rival firms,
change in cash levels, operating expenses and capital expenditure from pre to post takeover threat are
regressed against change in leverage. All ratios are computed as explained in previous sections.
The Results are reported in Table 12 and suggest that Safieddine and Titman (1999) findings for target
firms holds up for rival firms as well. Rival firms with higher increase in leverage in two years
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subsequent to initial takeover attempt in industry are found to significantly reduce their cash levels,
operating expenses and capital expenditure. This suggests managers of rival firms commit to improving
long-term performance of the firm.
Table 12: Change in Leverage and Change in Operating and Financial Performance
Change in Cash Levels

Change in Operating

Intercept

-0.0129 ***

-0.0076

Change in Capital
-0.0046*

Change in long term debt

-0.1463***

-0.1311***

-0.0144***

R-SQUARE

0.03

0.01

0.06

N

4402

4402

4402

CONCLUSION
Song and Walkling (SW) (2000) find that rivals of initial targets earn abnormal returns because of an
increased probability that they themselves will be targets. Existing takeover literature suggests that
removal of inefficient management to improve operating performance is one of the key underlying
motives for takeovers. Thus, poorly performing firms are more likely to be the target of a takeover
attempt following an initial takeover announcement in their industry. This paper investigates whether the
managers of rival firms act to mitigate their agency exposure when one a firms in the industry is subject
to a takeover attempt. Specifically, this research investigates if (a) the agency symptoms of rival firms
improve following the announcement of a control threat in their industries (b) these improvements are
related to the level of the agency problems of rival firms in the pre-takeover bid period.
The results indicate that the rival firms in general decrease cash levels and free cash flows, reduce
operating expenses and capital expenditures and they increase leverage in response to a control threat in
the industry. Consistent with the agency arguments underlying the acquisition probability hypothesis,
results indicate that the rival firms with few investment opportunities and high cash or high free cash
flows reduce cash levels and free cash flows subsequent to a control threat in their industry. In addition,
rivals with high managerial ownership increase leverage and reduce free cash flow in response to a
control threat. The results also indicate that rivals, which increase leverage in response to a control threat
also, reduce their cash levels, cash flows, capital expenditure and operating expenses.
Overall, the evidence supports the argument that takeovers act as an effective external control mechanism
for managers and that they have industry wide effects. Rival firms take steps to reduce their agency
exposure and improve operating efficiency in response to a control threat in the industry. This research
looks at only one possible reaction from rival firms. However, it is possible managers of some rival firms
will not improve their operating performance and entrench themselves more by using takeover defenses.
This and other possible responses from rival firms can be subject of future research.
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